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Public Goods Provision: On Generalizing the Jackson–Moulin Mechanism
Author(s) -
YU YAN
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00252.x
Subject(s) - impossibility , mechanism (biology) , public good , constant (computer programming) , mathematical economics , simple (philosophy) , class (philosophy) , economics , marginal cost , microeconomics , computer science , law , political science , philosophy , programming language , epistemology , artificial intelligence
Abstract Jackson and Moulin (1992) proposed a simple mechanism to implement a wide class of cost‐sharing rules for the provision of a binary public good. Bag (1997) generalized this mechanism to divisible public goods under the assumption of “constant marginal benefit.” This paper generalizes the Jackson–Moulin mechanism to a broader setting, including the cases of both decreasing and constant marginal benefit. Moreover, this paper shows the impossibility of generalizing the mechanism further.