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Endogenous Public Expenditures on Education
Author(s) -
BEARSE PETER,
GLOMM GERHARD,
PATTERSON DEBRA MOORE
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
journal of public economic theory
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.809
H-Index - 32
eISSN - 1467-9779
pISSN - 1097-3923
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00234.x
Subject(s) - voting , public education , economics , elasticity of substitution , private education , public economics , construct (python library) , majority rule , productivity , public good , microeconomics , higher education , economic growth , political science , production (economics) , law , politics , computer science , programming language
We construct a model of the determination of public funding of education through majority voting. Households have the option of privately supplementing public education. Alternatively, they can opt out of public education completely and choose private education. We find that in general the single‐crossing property cannot be used to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium. Numerical solutions of the model reveal (i) when public education inputs and private supplements are substitutes, private school enrollment is often zero; and (ii) the funding level for public education is very sensitive to the productivity of private supplements and the elasticity of substitution between public inputs and private supplements.