Debate: On Christiano's The Constitution of Equality

WHEN a principle like democracy becomes as widely accepted as it is today, the philosophical defensibility of a democratic stance becomes more interesting. It also becomes pressing because more views and actions are defended on the ground that they are part of democracy, or an implication of democracy, or required by democracy, or authorized by democracy. If the principle of democracy (or, more accurately, the principle that democracy, or only democracy, is authoritative, or legitimate, or justified, etc.) cannot be cogently defended then this set of views is a house of cards. Eventually, the winds will come and the cards will fall. Democracy is and always has been a vulnerable doctrine, which is not to say it isn’t correct. But it had better not be assumed to be correct. The objections need to be faced and answered. One of the most important objections is the charge that because the great masses of citizens are ignorant, or irrational, or immoral, or all three, political decisions would best be made by a more competent subset of people. Tom Christiano, in his recent book, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and Its Limits, provides, among other things, a deeply considered and philosophically original answer to this historically important (and always current) charge against democracy. In this short essay, I accept the journal’s invitation to discuss Christiano’s theory, and respond to his own essay in which he discusses the theory I develop in my recent book, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework. While this is what the occasion calls for, it can’t produce more than the most partial appreciation of the ingenuity and depth of Christiano’s book. I begin with a sketch of what I understand to be at the structural core of Christiano’s theory. (Christiano gives a helpful sketch of my view in his piece, so I forgo doing much of that here.) It is a political theory, but it is anchored in general moral principles. At the foundation of morality, Christiano argues, is the principle that everyone’s well-being is important, and equally so. Moral agents are required to recognize and honor this importance of the well-being of others, and also to do