Feminist Politics and Feminist Pluralism: Can We Do Feminist Political Theory Without Theories of Gender?

PHILOSOPHERS writing in normative political theory have recently focused our attention on two competing understandings of the normative foundations of liberalism. According to those calling themselves political liberals, liberal political philosophy can and should proceed without the help of a particular conception of the person and of moral validity. It is argued that political philosophy should propose political principles that could be found acceptable to citizens holding a wide variety of doctrines concerning what persons are, and what the proper ends of human and community life are. On this view, the acceptability of political principles depends on the fact that they do not conflict with the fundamental values of dominant ethical traditions. Comprehensive liberals, on the other hand, argue that political philosophy cannot be done without the help of a determinate conception of the person and moral validity. According to this view, we cannot say much of interest about how we ought to live together without knowing who we are and what the appropriate ends of human and community life are. Indeed, the comprehensive liberal accuses the political liberal of tacitly assuming such conceptions. Comprehensive liberals admit that their political doctrines, grounded as they are in particular and thus potentially controversial conceptions of the person and moral validity, may come into competition with common doctrines that citizens hold. But they believe that political philosophy cannot honestly avoid this result. Feminists have begun to consider the implications of this debate for feminist political philosophy. A common claim is that feminists ought not to be political The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 12, Number 4, 2004, pp. 411–436