Method, Philosophy of Education and the Sphere of the Practico‐Inert

This essay discusses a conception of the relation of philosophy to education that has come to be widely held in both general philosophy and philosophy of education. This view is approached here through the employment of Jean‐Paul Sartre's notion of the ‘practico‐inert’ as the realm of consolidated social objects, part of which is the institution of education. It is shown that a rigid demarcation of the practico‐inert, on the one hand, and praxis, on the other, lies at the heart of the contemporary philosophical stance towards education. Generally, philosophy today does not allocate redemptive‐political space to education and its practices (such as assessment). Hannah Arendt's and Alain Badiou's ideas on knowledge, statistics and everydayness are used here as examples, and the received view is further criticised. Then, another possible connection of philosophy and education is examined, one that would attribute to education a more active, politically operative and central role in philosophy.