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PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF VALUE THEORY: B. F. SKINNERS SCIENCE OF VALUES
Author(s) -
Rottschaefer William A.
Publication year - 1982
Publication title -
zygon®
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.222
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1467-9744
pISSN - 0591-2385
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9744.1982.tb00484.x
Subject(s) - neutrality , value (mathematics) , epistemology , teleology , naturalism , foundation (evidence) , intrinsic value (animal ethics) , psychological science , value theory , sociology , philosophy , positive economics , psychology , social psychology , law , environmental ethics , mathematics , economics , political science , statistics
. The thesis that the sciences are value neutral has recently been criticized severely. However, both the critics of the value‐neutrality thesis and its upholders share the separatist position that there is a fundamental dichotomy between fact and value, differing only on the degree to which science is impregnated with values. Skinner's claim that the science of operant behavior is the science of values rejects this dichotomy and is opposed to both the value‐neutrality thesis and criticisms of it. I examine Skinner's claim that psychology is value‐laden in the radical sense of providing a foundation for a theory of values and conclude that Skinner is arguing for an ethics and theory of values which is naturalistic, teleological, and both substantively and methodologically objective.