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Implementing Cross Compliance for Agriculture in the EU: Relational Agency, Power and Action in Different Socio‐Material Contexts
Author(s) -
Juntti Meri
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
sociologia ruralis
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.005
H-Index - 84
eISSN - 1467-9523
pISSN - 0038-0199
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9523.2012.00564.x
Subject(s) - subsidy , negotiation , agency (philosophy) , compliance (psychology) , normative , public economics , business , action (physics) , order (exchange) , agriculture , agricultural policy , economics , political science , sociology , law , finance , psychology , social psychology , social science , ecology , physics , quantum mechanics , biology
The cross compliance instrument is an EU wide policy mechanism that ties the payment of the remaining agricultural subsidies to compliance with environmental, animal welfare and food safety standards. Policy negotiations concerning the exact nature of the conditions in individual Member States draw on different environmental and economic circumstances and differing interpretations of farmers' role in the rural environment. This article reports on two case studies of decision‐making concerning the national cross compliance rules in England and Finland. Actor Network Theory is employed in order to understand how socio‐economic and environmental contexts combine to influence and constrain interviewed decision‐makers and the propositions they make regarding power and action in the implementation of the cross compliance mechanism. The approach uncovers some significant differences in the normative logic of how cross compliance is interpreted and delivered in the studied countries and highlights how ‘baseline environmental standards’ imply very different obligations for farmers in different member states. It is evident that a more flexible policy approach is needed to achieve a minimum level of environmental protection throughout the EU.