Premium
MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, SUPERVISION AND EMPLOYEE DISCRETION
Author(s) -
Amess Kevin,
Brown Sarah,
Thompson Steve
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
scottish journal of political economy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.4
H-Index - 46
eISSN - 1467-9485
pISSN - 0036-9292
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00424.x
Subject(s) - discretion , craft , business , ordered probit , service (business) , probit model , work (physics) , sample (material) , probit , labour economics , demographic economics , accounting , marketing , economics , econometrics , mechanical engineering , chemistry , archaeology , chromatography , political science , law , history , engineering
Using a matched sample of 1959 firms and 27,263 employees from the UK Workplace Employee Relations Survey , we examine the effects of the management buyout (MBO) organizational form on employee discretion and supervision. Our findings suggest that for MBO firms, supervision is lower where there is a higher proportion of craft and skilled service workers but is not lower for other occupational groups. Using random effects ordered probit analysis, we find that employees' discretion over their work practices is higher in MBO firms; and that the probability of higher discretion is greater where there is a higher proportion of craft and skilled service employees. Our findings are consistent with: (i) MBOs reducing hierarchical tiers and the number of supervisory staff, which increase employees' span of control and their discretion; and (ii) organizational change via an MBO being ‘skill biased’ in favour of craft and skilled service employees.