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Controlling Corruption in the Public Sector
Author(s) -
Andersson Staffan,
Bergman Torbjörn
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
scandinavian political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1467-9477
pISSN - 0080-6757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9477.2008.00222.x
Subject(s) - transparency (behavior) , language change , delegation , politics , principal (computer security) , public sector , political science , principal–agent problem , qualitative analysis , public administration , qualitative research , public relations , public economics , economics , sociology , corporate governance , law , social science , management , computer science , art , literature , operating system
Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal‐agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.