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States and Common Pool Resources
Author(s) -
Lane JanErik,
Jensen Svein Thore
Publication year - 1996
Publication title -
scandinavian political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1467-9477
pISSN - 0080-6757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9477.1996.tb00384.x
Subject(s) - commission , collective action , common pool resource , political science , action (physics) , baltic sea , economics , law , microeconomics , physics , geology , oceanography , quantum mechanics , politics
The neo‐institutionalist theory on the management of common pool resources by states in terms of international regimes is based on dubious assumptions about states as players. If one starts from alternative assumptions about interaction between asymmetrical players and the advantages of opportunistic behaviour, then it is easier to account for the collective action difficulties in a regime such as the Helsinki Commission (HELCOM), which handles the environmental problems in the Baltic Sea region.