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Constitutional Design and Government Formation: The Expected Consequences of Negative Parliamentarism
Author(s) -
Bergman Torbjörn
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
scandinavian political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1467-9477
pISSN - 0080-6757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9477.1993.tb00042.x
Subject(s) - government (linguistics) , socialization , voting , political science , perspective (graphical) , majority rule , process (computing) , political economy , law and economics , public administration , economics , sociology , law , politics , computer science , social science , artificial intelligence , philosophy , linguistics , operating system
In the early 1970s the Swedish parties designed new rules for government formation. In this study it is shown that the choice of a new voting rule stemmed from a combination of goaloriented behaviour and a process of socialization. In a cross national comparison, it is also shown that there exists an empirical correlation between the Swedish type of rule and (1) a high frequency of minority governments, (2) a high frequency of small minority governments and (3) a short government formation process. From the perspective of coalition formation theory, this is a challenging finding.