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The Distribution of A Priori Voting Power in the EC Council of Ministers and the European Parliament
Author(s) -
Herne Kaisa,
Nurmi Hannu
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
scandinavian political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1467-9477
pISSN - 0080-6757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9477.1993.tb00041.x
Subject(s) - parliament , voting , unanimity , council of ministers , political science , cardinal voting systems , ranked voting system , power (physics) , distribution (mathematics) , straight ticket voting , disapproval voting , politics , weighted voting , public administration , law , economics , european union , mathematics , international trade , mathematical analysis , physics , quantum mechanics
One of the most important decision making bodies in the EC is the Council of Ministers. In that voting body the member states have different voting weights roughly in proportion to the size of their populations. This article focuses on the voting power of current and prospective member states (Finland, Norway and Sweden) utililizing the Shapley‐Shubik and Banzhaf indices of voting power. As the decision rules play a crucial role in the computation of these indices, the a priori voting power distribution is considered under various decision rules ranging from simple majority to near unanimity. We also discuss the a priori voting power distribution of various political groupings in the current European Parliament and in the hypothetical parliament which would have Finland, Norway and Sweden as new members. Although thus far the real power base in the EC is the Commission, the analysis of voting power distributions in the Council of Ministers and in the parliament sheds some light upon the relative influence that various actors might have in EC decision‐making processes.