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On the Properties of Voting Systems
Author(s) -
Nurmi Hannu
Publication year - 1981
Publication title -
scandinavian political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.65
H-Index - 41
eISSN - 1467-9477
pISSN - 0080-6757
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9477.1981.tb00413.x
Subject(s) - minimax , axiom , voting , cardinal voting systems , consistency (knowledge bases) , mathematical economics , pareto principle , approval voting , social choice theory , preference , anti plurality voting , independence (probability theory) , simple (philosophy) , axiom independence , path (computing) , econometrics , computer science , mathematics , mathematical optimization , political science , statistics , epistemology , artificial intelligence , law , philosophy , programming language , geometry , politics
The article focuses on the problem of choosing the ‘best’ voting procedure for making collective decisions. The procedures discussed are simple majority rule, Borda count, approval voting, and maximin method. The first three have been axiomatized while the maximin method has not yet been given an axiomatic characterization. The properties, in terms of which the goodness of the procedures is assessed, are dictatorship, consistency, path independence, weak axiom of revealed preference, Pareto optimality, and manipulability. It turns out that the picture emerging from the comparison of the procedures in terms of these properties is most favorable to the approval voting.

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