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Falsifiability of political opinions
Author(s) -
LINDSTRÖM PER
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.743
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1467-9450
pISSN - 0036-5564
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9450.1995.tb00988.x
Subject(s) - falsifiability , rationality , psychology , epistemology , politics , power (physics) , explanatory power , social psychology , expert opinion , relation (database) , law , political science , philosophy , medicine , computer science , physics , quantum mechanics , database , intensive care medicine
The concept of “falsifiability,” taken from philosophy of science, was applied to the individual's political reasoning. 131 undergraduates, taking a position on the nuclear power issue, estimated: (a) importance attached to factual arguments supporting held opinion, and (b) degree of opinion change evoked by hypothetical disconfirmation of the arguments. The relation between these estimates was analyzed in two respects: (1) the difference served as an indicator of opinion falsifiability, and (2) the correlation served as an indicator of rationality, inasmuch as rationality dictates that disconfirmation of important arguments will evoke a more considerable opinion change than disconfirmation of unimportant arguments. Results showed that nuclear power opponents and subjects holding radically formulated opinions were more reluctant to opinion falsification, whereas degree of involvement in the issue was of no importance. No significant differences in rationality were observed, although additional analyses showed subjects to be more sensitive to disconfirmation of accepted, but opinion contradicting, arguments than to disconfirmation of opinion supporting arguments.