Premium
Phenomenological note on belief‐feeling and the relation between affect and belief
Author(s) -
JUNGE KENNETH
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.743
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1467-9450
pISSN - 0036-5564
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9450.1985.tb01165.x
Subject(s) - feeling , psychology , affect (linguistics) , social psychology , relation (database) , cognitive psychology , communication , database , computer science
It is asserted that there are two kinds of belief‐feeling, i.e., feeling (confident) that something is true or real. The difference between α‐feeling and β‐feeling of belief is analogous to the difference between having a sensory impression and merely imagining the impression. An α‐belief is a concomitant correlate of affect and it tends to be stronger than the corresponding β‐belief.