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Studies in subjective probability l: Prediction of random events
Author(s) -
TEIGEN KARL HALVOR
Publication year - 1983
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.743
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1467-9450
pISSN - 0036-5564
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9450.1983.tb00471.x
Subject(s) - representativeness heuristic , heuristics , psychology , outcome (game theory) , event (particle physics) , task (project management) , context (archaeology) , anchoring , social psychology , cognitive psychology , statistics , econometrics , computer science , mathematics , mathematical economics , paleontology , physics , management , quantum mechanics , economics , biology , operating system
When students are asked to predict the outcome of a random event, where all alternatives are equally probable (lotteries), they tend to choose central, “representative” values, and avoid extreme ones. In ten informal experiments, it is shown how this pattern of choices is influenced by various procedural and structural changes in the basic task. The results show that guessing behavior can be described as a kind of absolute judgment, subject to grouping, anchoring and context effects. Of the two general prediction heuristics originally proposed by Kahneman & Tversky (1973), “representativeness” applies better than “availability”. In fact, a major strategy of guessing is apparently to eschew numbers with prominent, “non‐random” properties, which at the same time are highly available to the subjects.