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How does the expectancy‐value model in psychology explain human action?
Author(s) -
VOLLMER FRED
Publication year - 1982
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.743
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1467-9450
pISSN - 0036-5564
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9450.1982.tb00418.x
Subject(s) - expectancy theory , psychology , action (physics) , interpretation (philosophy) , value (mathematics) , feeling , social psychology , cognitive psychology , epistemology , linguistics , philosophy , physics , quantum mechanics , machine learning , computer science
The topic discussed is how the expectancy‐value model in psychology can be interpreted. A causal interpretation of the model implies that intentions, wants, and beliefs are independent mental causes of human action. A number of arguments against this way of conceptualizing mental events in relation to action are presented. On the basis of these arguments it is concluded that the concepts of ‘intention’, ‘want’, ‘belief’, and the like, cannot be thought of as referring to events that are extrinsic to, and independent of, action and linguistic usage. Intending, wanting, believing, comprise saying and doing things in certain ways and contexts, as well as other events (imagery, feeling, experience) with which action and language belong and are intrinsically related. Relating what people say and do to intentions, wants, beliefs, serves to illuminate or interpret words and deeds, not to point out their independent, extrinisic causes. A causal interpretation of the expectancy‐value model, it is concluded, is not tenable.