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An Incentive‐Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem *
Author(s) -
Laslier JeanFrançois,
Weibull Jörgen W.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01734.x
Subject(s) - condorcet method , mathematical economics , majority rule , voting , economics , private information retrieval , jury , state (computer science) , microeconomics , nash equilibrium , group (periodic table) , incentive , group decision making , mathematics , law , social psychology , statistics , psychology , political science , algorithm , politics , chemistry , organic chemistry
We consider a group of individuals who face a binary collective decision. Each group member holds some private information, and all agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown, and members can differ in their valuations of the two types of mistakes that might occur, and in their prior beliefs about the true state. For a slightly randomized majority rule, we show that informative voting by all voters is the unique Nash equilibrium, that this equilibrium is strict, and that the Condorcet asymptotic efficiency result holds in this setting.