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Incentives and the Sorting of Altruistic Agents into Street‐Level Bureaucracies *
Author(s) -
Buurman Margaretha,
Dur Robert
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01723.x
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , altruism (biology) , incentive , sorting , compensation (psychology) , economics , selection (genetic algorithm) , microeconomics , sort , distribution (mathematics) , public economics , social psychology , political science , law , psychology , politics , computer science , artificial intelligence , information retrieval , mathematical analysis , programming language , mathematics
Many street‐level bureaucrats have the dual task of helping some clients, while sanctioning others. We develop a model of a street‐level bureaucracy, and we study the implications of its personnel policy on the self‐selection and allocation decisions of agents who differ in altruism towards clients. When bureaucrats are paid flat wages, they do not sanction, and the most altruistic types sort into bureaucracy. Pay‐for‐performance induces some bureaucrats to sanction, but it necessitates an increase in compensation, which can result in sorting from the top and bottom of the altruism distribution. We also explain why street‐level bureaucrats often experience an overload of clients.