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Party Discipline and Environmental Policy: The Role of “Smoke‐filled Back Rooms” *
Author(s) -
Fredriksson Per G.,
Wollscheid Jim R.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01618.x
Subject(s) - commit , language change , environmental policy , government (linguistics) , work (physics) , economics , public economics , political science , public administration , environmental resource management , mechanical engineering , art , linguistics , philosophy , literature , database , computer science , engineering
We adopt the view that greater party discipline induces legislators to commit to promised policies after being elected. We then develop the hypothesis that the effect of party discipline on the stringency of environmental policy is conditional on the degree of government corruption. Our empirical work suggests that greater party discipline results in more stringent environmental policies when the level of corruption is relatively low, but in weaker policies when the level of corruption is comparatively high.