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Simple Reputation Systems *
Author(s) -
Kennes John,
Schiff Aaron
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2007.00481.x
Subject(s) - honesty , reputation , quality (philosophy) , simple (philosophy) , punishment (psychology) , microeconomics , economics , information asymmetry , product (mathematics) , business , social psychology , psychology , law , philosophy , geometry , mathematics , epistemology , political science
We develop a model of simple “reputation systems” that monitor and publish information about the behavior of sellers in a search market with asymmetric information. The reputations created influence the equilibrium search patterns of buyers and thus provide for market‐based “punishment” of bad behavior. We show that a reputation system that rewards honesty can enhance welfare by allowing good sellers to truthfully signal their type. However, the same system can be prone to strategic manipulation by sellers who always have low‐quality products. In that case, we show that an alternative system which assigns reputations based on product quality rather than honesty can be superior.