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Lobbying Bureaucrats *
Author(s) -
Bennedsen Morten,
Feldmann Sven E.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00473.x
Subject(s) - delegate , bureaucracy , delegation , economics , legislature , interest group , government (linguistics) , control (management) , public economics , public administration , microeconomics , political science , politics , law , management , computer science , linguistics , philosophy , programming language
We study how interest group lobbying of the bureaucracy affects policy outcomes and how it changes the legislature's willingness to delegate decision‐making authority to the bureaucracy. We extend the standard model of delegation to account for interest group influence during the implementation stage of policy. We analyze how the decision to delegate changes when the bureaucratic agent is subject to external influence. The optimal degree of delegation as well as the extent to which interest groups influence policy outcomes differ depending on whether the system of government is characterized by unified or divided control. The result is a comparative theory of bureaucratic lobbying.