Premium
Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption
Author(s) -
Myerson Roger B.
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
the scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00469.x
Subject(s) - voting , language change , competition (biology) , simple (philosophy) , democracy , preference , majority rule , economics , power (physics) , politics , political science , law and economics , public economics , microeconomics , political economy , law , philosophy , art , ecology , physics , literature , epistemology , quantum mechanics , biology
The goals of democratic competition are not only to implement a majority's preference on policy questions, but also to provide a deterrent against corrupt abuse of power by political leaders. We consider a simple model of multicandidate elections in which different electoral systems can be compared according to these two criteria. Among a wide class of single‐winner scoring rules, only approval voting is found to satisfy both effectiveness against corruption and majoritarianism for this model.