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International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting *
Author(s) -
Buchholz Wolfgang,
Haupt Alexander,
Peters Wolfgang
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
scandinavian journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.725
H-Index - 64
eISSN - 1467-9442
pISSN - 0347-0520
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00401.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , incentive , voting , outcome (game theory) , economics , stochastic game , public economics , microeconomics , international trade , political science , law , politics
This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of “global” pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non‐cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.