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Bilateral Trade Agreements and the Feasibility of Multilateral Free Trade
Author(s) -
Saggi Kamal,
Yildiz Halis Murat
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
review of international economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.513
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-9396
pISSN - 0965-7576
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2011.00952.x
Subject(s) - free trade , economics , bilateral trade , international economics , international trade , international free trade agreement , nash equilibrium , trade barrier , microeconomics , law , china , political science
We studied how the pursuit of bilateral free‐trade agreements (FTAs) affects the likelihood of achieving multilateral free trade. We derive and compare the stable Nash equilibria of two games of trade liberalization: in the FTA game, each country can either form an FTA with one of its trading partners or both of them or none of them, whereas in the (restricted) No FTA game, purely bilateral FTAs are not permitted. The major result is that there exist circumstances under which the freedom to pursue (discriminatory) bilateral FTAs is necessary for achieving multilateral free trade.