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Market Entry Regulation and International Competition *
Author(s) -
Stähler Frank,
Upmann Thorsten
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
review of international economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.513
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-9396
pISSN - 0965-7576
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00767.x
Subject(s) - economics , production (economics) , microeconomics , competition (biology) , pareto principle , production cost , government (linguistics) , market competition , industrial organization , market economy , operations management , mechanical engineering , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , engineering , biology
We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.