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The Growth Effects of National Patent Policies *
Author(s) -
Dinopoulos Elias,
Kottaridi Constantina
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
review of international economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.513
H-Index - 58
eISSN - 1467-9396
pISSN - 0965-7576
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00742.x
Subject(s) - harmonization , intellectual property , economics , endogenous growth theory , technology transfer , international trade , international economics , wage , product (mathematics) , construct (python library) , market economy , political science , physics , geometry , mathematics , acoustics , law , computer science , programming language , human capital
We construct a two‐country (innovative North and imitating South) model of product‐cycle trade, fully endogenous Schumpeterian growth, and national patent policies. A move towards harmonization based on stronger Southern intellectual property rights (IPR) protection accelerates the long‐run global rates of innovation and growth, reduces the North–South wage gap, and has an ambiguous effect on the rate of international technology transfer. Patent harmonization constitutes a suboptimal global‐growth policy. However, if the global economy is governed by a common patent policy regime, then stronger global IPR protection: (a) increases the rates of global innovation and growth; (b) accelerates the rate of international technology transfer; and (c) has no impact on the North–South wage gap.