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Odious Debt in an Imperfect World
Author(s) -
Janus Thorsten
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2012.00663.x
Subject(s) - economics , debt , government debt , external debt , imperfect , internal debt , monetary economics , consumption (sociology) , government (linguistics) , population , welfare , international economics , macroeconomics , market economy , social science , linguistics , philosophy , demography , sociology
The odious debt problem refers to a government's ability to borrow for elite consumption while the general population repays. Although an intuitive response is to ban lending to such regimes, this paper shows that if a government faces endogenous replacement risk, then an international odious debt doctrine which (i) decreases the country's debt ceiling; (ii) decreases the likelihood that the citizens must repay the debt; or (iii) increases the government's cost of borrowing for a given default risk can all decrease citizens' welfare. These findings suggest that, even when a regime is clearly odious, allowing it to borrow up to a point may be preferable to a complete lending ban.