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Institutions and the Relation between Corruption and Economic Growth
Author(s) -
de Vaal Albert,
Ebben Wouter
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2010.00596.x
Subject(s) - language change , bureaucracy , economics , rent seeking , relation (database) , public good , public economics , development economics , economic system , political science , microeconomics , politics , law , art , literature , database , computer science
Abstract We study the effects of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth in a framework that takes into account that corruption also affects growth through its impact on institutions. We use a formal growth framework in which corruption affects growth negatively because of individual rent‐seeking and stealing of public goods, but where corruption may serve a positive role by taking over the role of institutions. We find that the overall effect of corruption on economic growth is highly dependent on the institutional setting of a country. Particularly in situations where institutions are not well developed corruption may be conducive to economic growth. We also find that the interaction among institutions themselves matters. This underscores the importance of taking into account the complete institutional setting when studying corruption, both in theory as well as empirically.