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Partial Compliance with Economic Sanctions
Author(s) -
Beladi Hamid,
Oladi Reza
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00454.x
Subject(s) - sanctions , compliance (psychology) , economics , outcome (game theory) , pareto optimal , economic sanctions , pareto principle , bridging (networking) , microeconomics , public economics , political science , psychology , set (abstract data type) , social psychology , operations management , law , computer science , programming language , computer network
By bridging the gap between the strategic model of sanctions and the public choice framework of sanctions, the authors introduce a new sanctions game. Contrary to an earlier finding, they show that the partial compliance of the target country, along with mild sanctions, are not only an equilibrium outcome, but also Pareto superior to non‐compliance and tough economic sanctions.