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Quasi‐Competitive Cournot Oligopoly with Product Differentiation and Symmetric Firms
Author(s) -
Okuguchi Koji
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00413.x
Subject(s) - oligopoly , cournot competition , product differentiation , collusion , economics , bertrand competition , bertrand paradox (economics) , microeconomics , limit (mathematics) , cartel , product (mathematics) , mathematical economics , mathematics , mathematical analysis , geometry
Since Vives (1984), Cheng (1985) and Okuguchi (1987), the equilibria in Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies with product differentiation have been known to differ. Okuguchi (2005) has shown that Bertrand price‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms is quasi‐competitive but not perfectly competitive in the limit state of infinite number of firms. This paper formulates and analyzes two types of Cournot output‐adjusting oligopoly with product differentiation and symmetric firms, in one of which symmetric firms producing the same goods are assumed to collude, and in the other, collusion is ruled out. The limit states are shown to be different in two oligopolies but they are both quasi‐competitive.