Premium
Optimal Commodity Taxation with a Representative Agent
Author(s) -
Kemp Murray C.,
Shimomura Koji
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00405.x
Subject(s) - commodity , economics , microeconomics , task (project management) , mathematical economics , vector (molecular biology)
It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price‐taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom