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Optimal Commodity Taxation with a Representative Agent
Author(s) -
Kemp Murray C.,
Shimomura Koji
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00405.x
Subject(s) - commodity , economics , microeconomics , task (project management) , mathematical economics , vector (molecular biology)
Abstract It is argued that the task of describing the optimal vector of commodity taxes is trivialized by the traditional assumption of a price‐taking representative agent; that, in particular, the assumption of a representative agent ensures that the null vector is optimal.