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Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions
Author(s) -
Cavallari Lilia,
Gioacchino Debora Di
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
review of development economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.531
H-Index - 50
eISSN - 1467-9361
pISSN - 1363-6669
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00275.x
Subject(s) - economics , fiscal union , fiscal policy , monetary economics , volatility (finance) , inflation (cosmology) , macroeconomics , stabilization policy , monetary policy , interest rate , international economics , finance , physics , theoretical physics
This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.