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The Regular Practice of Morality in Law
Author(s) -
GIUDICE MICHAEL
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2007.00381.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , positivism , morality , epistemology , law , legal positivism , philosophy , philosophy of law , law and economics , sociology , political science , comparative law , biochemistry , chemistry
. This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law.