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Levinasian Ethics and Legal Obligation *
Author(s) -
CROWE JONATHAN
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00337.x
Subject(s) - obligation , moral obligation , face (sociological concept) , relation (database) , epistemology , ethical theory , philosophy , sociology , law , political science , social science , database , computer science
. This paper discusses the implications of the ethical theory of Emmanuel Levinas for theoretical debates about legal obligation. I begin by examining the structure of moral reasoning in light of Levinas's account of ethics, looking particularly at the role of the “third party” ( le tiers ) in modifying Levinas's primary ethical structure of the “face to face” relation. I then argue that the primordial role of ethical experience in social discourse, as emphasised by Levinas, undermines theories, such as that of H. L. A. Hart, that propose a systematic distinction between legal and moral species of obligation.