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A Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority
Author(s) -
LEFKOWITZ DAVID
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2005.00302.x
Subject(s) - intuition , argument (complex analysis) , democracy , law and economics , economic justice , law , action (physics) , sociology , political science , epistemology , philosophy , politics , chemistry , biochemistry , physics , quantum mechanics
. This paper provides a defense of the following thesis: When there is reasonable disagreement over the design of morally necessary collective action schemes, it would not be reasonable to reject the authority of a democratic decision procedure to settle these disputes. My first argument is a straightforward application of contractualist reasoning, and mirrors T. M. Scanlon's defense of a principle of fairness for the distribution of benefits produced by a cooperative scheme. My second argument develops and defends the intuition that treating others morally requires respecting their exercise of moral judgment, or a sense of justice. I conclude by addressing the problem of disagreement over the design of the democratic decision procedure itself, and rebutting Jeremy Waldron's claim that democratic authority is incompatible with judicial review.