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Conflicting Views on Practical Reason. Against Pseudo‐Arguments in Practical Philosophy*
Author(s) -
WEINBERGER OTA
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9337.1992.tb00128.x
Subject(s) - epistemology , action (physics) , jurisprudence , philosophy , semantics (computer science) , philosophy of language , computer science , metaphysics , physics , theology , quantum mechanics , programming language
The author distinguishes two concepts of practical reason: (a) practical reason as a source of practical principles, and (b) practical reason as the theory of thought operations connected with action. He proves that there is no practical recognition in the sense (a). We can deal with actions only on the basis of dichotomic semantics. Critical analyses of some theories of practical reason are presented (Kant, Lorenzen, Apel, Alexy). The critical part of the paper mainly concerns the discourse theory and its implications for practical philosophy and jurisprudence.