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Legal Reasoning as a Special Case of Moral Reasoning
Author(s) -
PECZENIK ALEKSANDER
Publication year - 1988
Publication title -
ratio juris
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.344
H-Index - 10
eISSN - 1467-9337
pISSN - 0952-1917
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9337.1988.tb00009.x
Subject(s) - prima facie , action (physics) , epistemology , compromise , disposition , literal (mathematical logic) , moral reasoning , practical reason , value (mathematics) , philosophy , law , psychology , political science , computer science , linguistics , physics , quantum mechanics , machine learning
. Moral statements are related to some ought‐ and good‐making facts. If at least one of these facts exists then it is reasonable that an action in question is prima facie good and obligatory. If all of these facts take place, then it is reasonable that the action is definitively good and obligatory. Yet, moral reasoning is relatively uncertain. The law is more “fixed”. Legal interpretatory statements ought to express a compromise between the literal sense of the law and moral considerations. They can be to a high degree both coherent and accepted. One may emotionally reject them but most people have a disposition to endorse a coherent and commonly accepted value system.