Premium
ARE EMOTIONS PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES OF VALUE?
Author(s) -
Whiting Demian
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00518.x
Subject(s) - perception , nothing , modality (human–computer interaction) , feeling , psychology , modalities , two factor theory of emotion , value (mathematics) , cognitive psychology , stimulus modality , emotion perception , emotion work , social psychology , affective science , epistemology , philosophy , computer science , sociology , social science , human–computer interaction , neuroscience , machine learning
A number of emotion theorists hold that emotions are perceptions of value. In this paper I say why they are wrong. I claim that in the case of emotion there is nothing that can provide the perceptual modality that is needed if the perceptual theory is to succeed (where by ‘perceptual modality’ I mean the particular manner in which something is perceived). I argue that the five sensory modalities are not possible candidates for providing us with ‘emotional perception’. But I also say why the usual candidate offered – namely feeling or affectivity – does not give us the sought‐after perceptual modality. I conclude that as there seems to be nothing else that can provide the needed perceptual modality, we should reject the perceptual theory of emotion. 1
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom