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SHOULD WE DE‐MORALIZE ETHICAL THEORY?
Author(s) -
McElwee Brian
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00469.x
Subject(s) - morality , moral obligation , epistemology , obligation , ethical theory , action (physics) , ethical theories , normative ethics , sociology , environmental ethics , psychology , philosophy , social psychology , political science , law , physics , quantum mechanics
Some philosophers, such as Roger Crisp and Alastair Norcross, have recently argued that the traditional moral categories of wrongness, permissibility and obligation should be avoided when doing ethical theory. I argue that even if morality does not itself provide reasons for action, the moral categories nevertheless have a central role to play in ethical theory: they allow us to make crucial judgements about how to feel about, and react to, agents who behave in anti‐social ways, and they help motivate us to act altruistically.