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MORAL PERCEPTION AND THE CAUSAL OBJECTION
Author(s) -
McBrayer Justin P.
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2010.00468.x
Subject(s) - moral realism , skepticism , perception , epistemology , moral disengagement , action (physics) , psychology , social cognitive theory of morality , worry , moral reasoning , moral psychology , natural (archaeology) , internalism and externalism , morality , social psychology , philosophy , history , anxiety , physics , archaeology , quantum mechanics , psychiatry
One of the primary motivations behind moral anti‐realism is a deep‐rooted scepticism about moral knowledge. Moral realists attempt counter this worry by sketching a plausible moral epistemology. One of the most radical proposals in the recent literature is that we know moral facts by perception – we can literally see that an action is wrong, etc. A serious objection to moral perception is the causal objection. It is widely conceded that perception requires a causal connection between the perceived and the perceiver. But, the objection continues, we are not in appropriate causal contact with moral properties. Therefore, we cannot perceive moral properties. This papers demonstrates that the causal objection is unsound whether moral properties turn out to be secondary, natural properties; non‐secondary, natural properties; or non‐natural properties. 1