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WHY QUALIA ARE NOT EPIPHENOMENAL
Author(s) -
Muller Hans
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00386.x
Subject(s) - qualia , argument (complex analysis) , epistemology , philosophy , consciousness , chemistry , biochemistry
In this article, I give an original objection to Frank Jackson's argument for the conclusion that the subjective, felt properties of experience are causally inert. I show that the very act of asserting the existence of these properties undermines the claim that they are epiphenomenal. If this objection goes through, it is fatal to the argument in question. 1