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RULE‐FOLLOWING WITHOUT REASONS: WITTGENSTEIN'S QUIETISM AND THE CONSTITUTIVE QUESTION
Author(s) -
Wright Crispin
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2007.00379.x
Subject(s) - conflation , epistemology , objectivity (philosophy) , meaning (existential) , philosophy , focus (optics) , optics , physics
This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky, 1 hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule‐following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (though connected) issues about rules, meaning, objectivity, and reasons, whose conflation is encouraged by the standard caption, ‘the Rule‐following Considerations’. 2 Let me begin by explaining my focus here.