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COGNITIVE CLOSURE AND THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING
Author(s) -
Sacks Mark
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00151.x
Subject(s) - naturalism , epistemology , argument (complex analysis) , philosophy , deflation , set (abstract data type) , closure (psychology) , dissolution , law , chemistry , computer science , political science , economics , keynesian economics , monetary policy , biochemistry , programming language
The paper begins by distinguishing between two ways of effecting the dissolution of a philosophical problem: reductive and philosophical. Of these, the former holds out deflationary prospects greater than those of the latter. Attention focuses specifically on McGinn's proposed dissolution of the mind‐body problem. Examination of his argument reveals that his naturalist dissolution involves traditional non‐naturalist constraints, in a way that counts against his deflationary conclusions. At best his treatment constitutes a philosophical, rather than a reductive dissolution. But there is reason to think that it might in fact constitute a mere relocation of what is, essentially, the same problem that it set out to dissolve.