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TRUTH, PERMANENCE, AND THE REGULATION OF BELIEF: LOEB'S CARTESIAN ARGUMENT 1
Author(s) -
Miller Alexander
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00058.x
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , idealism , epistemology , philosophy , perception , chemistry , biochemistry
In this paper I outline an argument which Louis Loeb attributes to Descartes, which attempts to ground the epistemic priority of reason over sense‐perception in the brute psychological irresistibility of the former. I claim that the position thus ascribed to Descartes collapses into a crude form of idealism, and attempt to pinpoint precisely the flaw in the argument which gives rise to this collapse. I finish by suggesting that the same flaw might be apparent in Philip Pettit's recent development of the notion of response‐dependent concepts.