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SCEPTICISM AND THE FRAMEWORK‐RELATIVITY OF ENQUIRY
Author(s) -
Daukas Nancy
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
ratio
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.475
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-9329
pISSN - 0034-0006
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9329.1994.tb00057.x
Subject(s) - skepticism , epistemology , judgement , philosophy , argument (complex analysis) , theory of relativity , perception , psychology , theoretical physics , medicine , physics
Many argue that sceptical enquiry is incoherent insofar as it requires a detachment from and assessment of the framework judgements that constitute our practice of enquiry. This paper accepts that enquiry is relative to a framework, but argues that the Cartesian sceptical enquiry is consistent with that relativity. Part I presents Marie McGinn's Wittgen‐steinian anti‐sceptical argument, comparing its view of enquiry to Carnap's. Part II clarifies the sense in which Wittgenstein's ‘Moore‐type’ framework judgements could be unquestionable, and argues that McGinn's antisceptical argument fails. Part III shows that the sceptical enquiry finds all our beliefs to lack justification by suspending our normal non‐sceptical framework judgement regarding perception in a way that is consistent with the framework‐relativity of enquiry, and encouraged by normal standards. The paper closes by recommending a view of scepticism as a stimulus for enquiry. 1