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THE STATE AND THE THREAT OF CASCADING FAILURE ACROSS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: THE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM MEDIA INCIDENT REPORTS
Author(s) -
VAN EETEN MICHEL,
NIEUWENHUIJS ALBERT,
LUIIJF ERIC,
KLAVER MARIEKE,
CRUZ EDITE
Publication year - 2011
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2011.01926.x
Subject(s) - cascading failure , domino effect , critical infrastructure , empirical evidence , government (linguistics) , business , computer security , critical infrastructure protection , state (computer science) , risk analysis (engineering) , computer science , political science , power (physics) , philosophy , physics , linguistics , electric power system , epistemology , algorithm , quantum mechanics , law
The threat of cascading failures across critical infrastructures has been identified as a key challenge for governments. Cascading failure is seen as potentially catastrophic, extremely difficult to predict and increasingly likely to happen. Infrastructures are largely privately operated and private actors are thought to under‐invest in mitigating this threat. Consequently, experts have demanded a more dominant role for government, including the use of regulation. Empirical evidence on cascading failure is, however, extremely scarce. This paper analyses new data drawn from news reports on incidents. We find that, contrary to current thinking, cascades are not rare. Neither do they indicate a wide array of unknown dependencies across infrastructures. Rather, we find a small number of focused, unidirectional pathways around two infrastructures: energy and telecommunications. We also found that most cascades were stopped quickly, in contrast to the oft‐cited ‘domino effect'. These findings undermine the case for more intrusive public oversight of critical infrastructures.