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POWER LEARNING OR PATH DEPENDENCY? INVESTIGATING THE ROOTS OF THE EUROPEAN FOOD SAFETY AUTHORITY
Author(s) -
ROEDERERRYNNING CHRISTILLA,
DAUGBJERG CARSTEN
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01832.x
Subject(s) - mandate , agency (philosophy) , food safety , delegation , european union , politics , public administration , european commission , political science , business , public relations , law , sociology , international trade , medicine , social science , pathology
A key motive for establishing the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was restoring public confidence in the wake of multiplying food scares and the BSE crisis. Scholars, however, have paid little attention to the actual political and institutional logics that shaped this new organization. This article explores the dynamics underpinning the making of EFSA. We examine the way in which learning and power shaped its organizational architecture. It is demonstrated that the lessons drawn from the past and other models converged on the need to delegate authority to an external agency, but diverged on its mandate, concretely whether or not EFSA should assume risk management responsibilities. In this situation of competitive learning, power and procedural politics conditioned the mandate granted to EFSA. The European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council shared a common interest in preventing the delegation of regulatory powers to an independent EU agency in food safety policy.