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BY VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT: THE POLITICS OF INSTRUMENT SELECTION
Author(s) -
BAGGOTT ROB
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
public administration
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.313
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1467-9299
pISSN - 0033-3298
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-9299.1986.tb00603.x
Subject(s) - legislation , parliament , statutory law , politics , context (archaeology) , principal (computer security) , selection (genetic algorithm) , turnover , political science , set (abstract data type) , trace (psycholinguistics) , public administration , public economics , law , economics , management , computer science , artificial intelligence , operating system , linguistics , philosophy , paleontology , biology , programming language
There are many ways in which policies can be sanctioned, and legislation is only one of a number of alternatives. This article examines one such alternative: voluntary agreements. After outlining the major characteristics of this policy instrument there is an examination of the various factors which appear to influence their selection in favour of legislation. This is followed by an attempt to trace a pattern of policy succession by examining three particular cases where there has been a change in the principal policy instrument. Finally, the discussion as a whole is set in the context of the executive domination of Parliament. The implications of the use of non‐statutory instruments, such as voluntary agreements, for this relationship are noted.