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Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union
Author(s) -
CHARI RAJ,
MURPHY GARY,
HOGAN JOHN
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
the political quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.373
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1467-923X
pISSN - 0032-3179
DOI - 10.1111/j.1467-923x.2007.00870.x
Subject(s) - parliament , legislation , politics , elite , european union , democracy , comparative politics , political science , ideal (ethics) , legislature , public administration , political system , ideal type , law and economics , political economy , law , sociology , business , international trade , social science
Lobbying is central to the democratic process. Yet, only four political systems have lobbying regulations: the United States, Canada, Germany and the EU (most particularly, the European Parliament). Despite the many works offering individual country analysis of lobbying legislation, a twofold void exists in the literature. Firstly, no study has offered a comparative analysis classifying the laws in these four political systems, which would improve understanding of the different regulatory environments. Secondly, few studies have analysed the views of key agents—politicians, lobbyists and regulators—and how these compare and contrast across regulatory environments. We firstly utilise an index measuring how strong the regulations are in each of the systems, and develop a classification scheme for the different ‘ideal’ types of regulatory environment. Secondly, we measure the opinions of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, exist between the different ideal types of system and their opinions. The conclusion highlights our findings, and the lessons that can be used by policy‐makers in systems without lobbying legislation.